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UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL-HIS RIGHTS
AND LIABILITIES
The doctrine that an undisclosed principal may sue and be
sued upon contracts made by his agent, as ostensible principal,
with third parties, is so firmly established in the law of England
and of this country, that it would be quixotic to attack it in the
courts. Nevertheless, whenever an established doctrine ignores,
as this doctrine of the undisclosed principal ignores, fundamental
legal principles, it is highly important that it should be recognized
as an anomaly, to be reckoned with of course, but not to be made
the basis of analogical reasoning. Unfortunately, a majority of
the judges and of the writers upon Agency and Contracts state
the rule as to the right and liability of the undisclosed principal
without any discussion of its soundness. Lord Cairns,' indeed,
and Sir William Anson - accept its soundness as self-evident.
On the other hand, Lord Davey,3  Lord Lindlev 4
and Smith, L. J.,5 in their judgments have treated the rule as an
anomaly, and Mr. Tiffany,8 Mr. Huffcut,7 Mr. Lewis" and Sir
Frederick Pollock have expressed a similar opinion in their writ-
ings. The latter condemns it in these strong terms: "The plain
truth ought never to be forgotten that the whole law as to the
1 Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504, 514.
2 Anson, Cont. (2nd Ed.). 346.
3 Keighiey v. Durant [ 9oi], A. C. 240. 256.
4 Keighley z. Durant [i9oi], A. C. 24o. 261.
5Durant v. Roberts [igoi], i Q. B. 629, 635. See also Lord Black-
burn's words in Armstrong z. Stokes, L. R. 7 Q. B. 598, 604.
8 Tiffany5 Agency, 232-233.
7 Huffcut, Agency, I66.
89 Columbia Lqzw Revicw, ix6, 13o.
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rights and liabilities of an undisclosed principal is inconsistent
with the elementary doctrines of the law of contract. The right
of one person to sue another on a contract not really made with
the person suing is unknown to every legal system except that of
England and America." I
This language, it is submitted, is not at all too strong. Let us
analyze the common case of a sale on credit of specified goods by
A to B, who, without A's knowledge, is buying for the benefit of
C. The title to the goods sold must pass from A to B, because
that was the declared intention of both parties. The actual tran-
saction is, therefore, a sale by A to B. But this sale by A to B
excludes the possibility of the sale of the same goods by A to C.1°
In other words, A could prove a count for goods sold to B in an
action against B, but could not prove a count for goods sold to C
in an action against C. The rule, therefore, which permits A to
charge either B or C at his option, permits a plaintiff to recover
on his allegation regardless of his evidence.
But although B, and not C, acquires the legal title from A, P.
holds that title from the outset for the benefit of C. The truth
of the matter is, therefore, that B, in buying for an undisclosed
principal, is not acting as an attorney or representative of his
employer, but as his trustee. If we suppose the subject of the
purchase to be land, this statement may be more convincing.
When A conveys the land to B, no one will say that the title
passes to C. But B, who gets the title, does not hold it for him-
self, but as trustee for-C. To say that A may charge C upon P's
contract of purchase, is to maintain what no one would maintain,
that a cestui que trust may be sued, and at law, upon contracts
between the trustee and third persons.
The rule which permits the undisclosed principal to sue the
third person, who has contracted with the agent, in ignorance of
9 3 L. Q. Review 359. See also 14 L. Q. Review 5.
10The impossibility of the sale of the same goods at the same
moment both to the agent and to his principal, is illustrated by Hinson v.
Berridge, Moore 701, pl. 975, decided in 1595, when an action of
assumpsit was not allowed, if the facts would support a count in debt. In
this case, C, in consideration of the sale of 200 lambs by A to B, the factor
of C, at a price to be agreed upon by A and B, promised to pay A the
said price. To an action of assumpsit on this promise C objected that the
action should have been in debt, as the sale was to him. "But all the
judges contra, for the words are that he should sell to B to the use of C,
so the sale was to B, and the use is only a confidence, which does not give
a title (property) at law, so that debt lies not against C, but assumpsit."
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the agency, is no more defensible than that which sanctions a
direct action by the third person against the undisclosed principal.
Suppose, for example, mutual promises by A to sell and convey
and by B to buy a tract of land, B acting for the benefit of C,
but A having no knowledge of this fact. A certainly becomes
bound to B. This is the necessary result of their declared inten-
tions. It is equally clear that neither intended that A .should
assume more than one obligation. It follows, therefore, that
there can be no direct obligation of A to C. Indirectly, indeed,
C may reap the fruits of this contract, for B having acquired A's
obligation for the benefit of C holds it, from the moment of its
acquisition, as a trust-res. Here again B is acting not as the
attorney, or representative, but as the trustee of C.
Logically, then, there is no direct relation between the undis-
closed principal and the third person with whom the agent con-
tracts. Only with the agent does the third person stand in the
relation of obligor and obligee. Only the agent should sue, or be
sued by, the third person. The soundness of these logical con-
clusions, and the unsoundness of the English and American doc-
trine to the contrary, find confirmation in the law of other
countries. By the German law, the undisclosed principal cannot
maintain an action against the third person with whom his agcnt
has contracted unless the agent has assigned the claim to the prin-
cipal ;" and on the other hand, no action can be maintained by
the third person against the undisclosed principal. 2 The French
law is to the same effect,13 as is the law of Spain14 and other
European countries.' 5
Even in England and America the anomalous rule by which
one may sue or be sued upon a contract to which he is not a
"1 i Entscheidungen d. Reichs-Gerichts, No. 116; Staub, Cominentar .
Handelsgeset-buch, 1739.
12 2 Entschzeidungen des Reichs-Gerichts, No. 43; 16 Entscheiduugen
des R. 0. H. G., No. 24.
13 "Les tiers ne connaissent, ou sont census ne connaitre que le pr~te-
nom: c' est lui qui est leur cr~ancier, lui qui est leur d~biteur, lui qui est
propri~taire des biens mis sous son nom. Ils ont donc le droit de le
poursuivre et ils peuvent Etre poursuivis par lue; et, d'autre part, ils ne
peuvent poursuivre que lui ou n' tre poursuivis que par lui." 2 Planiol,
Droit Civil, Sect. 2271. See also 21 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Droit Civil,
Sect. 897.
14 Mildred v. Maspons, 8 App. Cas. 874, 887.
15 For the law of Lower Canada see V. Hudon Co. v. Canada Co., 13
Can. S. C. R. 401.
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party, is of limited scope. No action may be brought, in those
countries, by or against an undisclosed principal upon a contract
under seal, upon a bill of exchange or promissory note, nor for
dividends or assessments due to or from a shareholder of a cor-
poration'0 ; nor even upon a simple contract when the agent, act-
ing for several undisclosed principals, instead of making separate
contracts in behalf of each, makes a single lump contract in behalf
of all.27  Moreover, this anomalous doctrine is a modern
notion. There is no trace of it in the days when the action of
debt was the normal remedy upon simple contracts. The agent
of the undisclosed principal received the quid pro quo from the
third person; he, therefore, and he only could be the debtor.'$
The first judicial sanction of the doctrine is by Lee, C. J., as late
as 1743, in the nisi prius case of Schrimshire v. Alderton, 1
This case is instructive by reason of the reluctance of the jury to
accept the direction of the judge. The action was brought by
the undisclosed principal for the price of goods sold byhis factor.
The buyer paid the factor, although the latter had failed and the
principal had sent him notice not to do so. The judge "directed
the jury in favor of the plaintiff. They went out and found for
the defendant; were sent out a second, and a third time to re-
consider it, and still adhered to their verdict; and being asked
man by man. they separately declared they found for the de-
fendant." Upon this a new trial was granted. "And at the sit-
tings after this term, it came again before a special jury; when
the Chief Justice declared that a factor's sale does by the general
rule of law create a contract between the owner and the buyer.
But notwithstanding this, the jury found for the defendant; and
being asked their reasons, declared that they thought from the
circumstances no credit was given as between the owner and the
buyer, and that the latter was answerable to the factor only, and
he only to the owner." This case recalls the earlier struggle of
Lord Holt with the merchants as to the negotiability of promis-
sory notes. In the later case as in the earlier one, the business
men, although overridden by a masterful judge, were in the
right, Alderton, the buyer, was the debtor of the factor, the
latter holding his claim as trustee for the principal. The debtor
16 See Hinson v. Berridge, summarized, supra, 444 n. io
17 Roosevelt v.Doherty, 129 Mass. 301.
18 See Hinson v. Berridge, summarized, supra, 444 n. lO.
92 Stra. 1182.
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was justified in paying the factor unless he had reason to suppose
that the latter would use the money for his own purposes, and
even in such a case his payment would make him liable to the
principal, not at law, but only in equity for confederating with
a delinquent trustee. The right to charge the undisclosed prin-
cipal as a defendant was established in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century.
Why, it may be asked, did the English and American courts
sanction a doctrine, logically indefensible, and not recognized in
other countries? No better answer has been found in the books
than this statement of Lord Lindley: "The explanation of the
doctrine that an undisclosed principal can sue and be sued on a
contract made in the name of another person with his authority is,
that the contract is in truth, although not in form, that of the
undisclosed principal himself. Both the principal and the authority
exist when the contract is made; and the person who makes it for
him is only the instrument by which the principal acts. In allow-
ing him to sue and be sued upon it, effect is given, so far as he
is concerned, to what is true in fact, although that truth may not
be known to the other party.
"At the same time, as a contract is constituted by the concur-
rence of two or more persons and by their agreement to the same
terms, there is an anomaly in holding one person bound to another
of whom he knows nothing and with whom he did not, in fact,
intend to contract. But middlemen, through whom contracts are
made, are common and useful in business, and in the great mass
of contracts it is a matter of indifference to either party whether
there is an undisclosed principal or not. If he exists it is, to say
the least, extremely convenient that he should be able to sue and
be sued as a principal, and he is only allowed to do so upon terms
which exclude injustice." 9
Lord Lindley makes it clear that the English doctrine was the
outcome of the feeling that it was just that the undisclosed prin-
cipal should have the benefits and the burdens of the contract
made in his behalf. But although he sees the anomalous char-
acter of the doctrine, it seems not to have occurred to him or to
the judges who introduced it, that a more perfect justice might
have been worked out without any sacrifice of the elementary
principles of the law of contract. The failure to see how the
desired justice could be brought about in any other way is the
9 Keighley v. Durant [igoi], A. C.'24o, 261.
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true explanation, it is believed, of the rule permitting the undis-
closed principal to sue and be sued upon contracts made by his
agent.
Let us see what measure of justice might have been attained,
if actions by and against the undisclosed principal had not been
allowed. Obviously there would have been the same relation be-
tween the third person and the agent in the case of simple con-
tracts, which now exists in the case of contracts under seal and
of bills of exchange and promissory notes. As to claims against
the third person, the agent, and the agent only would be the
obligee; as to claims in favor of the third person, the agent and
the agent only would be the obligor.
To take up first claims in favor of the agent. The agent holds
the legal title to the claim against the third person as he would
hold the title to a covenant or note. But as he acquired it for the
benefit of the undisclosed principal, he is trustee of it for the
latter. The undisclosed principal as cestui que trust would realize
indirectly through the trustee all that under the actual law he
now obtains from him by a direct action against him. The third
person would have the same defenses against the trustee suing
for the principal, his cestui quc trust, which he now has against
the principal suing in his own name. The only difference would
be this, that his defenses to an action by the agent suing as trus-
tee would be legal defenses, whereas his defenses to an action by
the principal in his own name are, strictly speaking, equitable
defenses based upon estoppel. If the agent should become bank-
rupt before collecting the claim against the third person, the claim
being held byhim as trustee would not pass to his assignee in bank-
ruptcy, but would continue tobe held by him in trust for the prin-
cipal, and if the claim should be paid to the assignee in bank-
ruptcy, the latter would have to account for it in full to the
principal. One case may be put in which the existing anomalous
doctrine and the trust theory here suggested would lead to op-
posite results. Suppose A has contracted to sell a tract of land
to B, who was acting for C, an undisclosed principal, and that B,
in violation of his duty to C has sold his claim against A to P, a
purchaser for value without notice of C's interest therein. Under
the rule which gives C a direct right against A, P must give way
to the prior claim of C. But if C is only cestui que trust of the
claim held by B against A, P will prevail over C in the numerous
jurisdictions in this country in which the bona fide-purchaser of a
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chose in action takes it free and clear of equities in favor of per-
sons other than the obligor. The preference of the bona tide
purchaser over the undisclosed principal, it is submitted, is more
satisfactory than the opposite result.
But the real difficulty is not in giving the undisclosed principal
the benefit of the third person's contract with the agent, but in
imposing upon the principal the burden of the agent's contract
with the third person. If we accept the sound view that the
agent alone can be charged directly upon the contract with the
third person, is it true, as the courts seem to have assumed, that
there is no way by which the third person may indirectly hold the
undisclosed principal responsible for the fulfilment of the agent's
contract? No, the assumption of the judges is not well-founded.
There is a mode of legal procedure, which, without any departure
from legal principles, would give the third person whenever he
needs and, in justice, is entitled to it, the power to compel the
undisclosed principal to make good the contract of his agent.
The relation of principal and agent carries with it without any
express agreement, the obligation on the part of the principal not
only to repay the agent for all legitimate disbursements, but also
to save him harmless from all authorized undertakings made by
him as agent. In other words, the principal is subject to two
distinct duties, the duty of reimbursement and the duty of exon-
eration.2 0 Accordingly, if the agent has entered into a contract
with a third person for the purchase of the latter's land for
$io,ooo, although the agent, and the agent only, is chargeable on
the promise to the seller to pay the purchase money, the undis-
closed principal is also liable on his separate promise to the agent
to pay, or to provide the funds with which the agent may pay,
the seller. This right of the agent to exoneration by the prin-
cipal is a thing of value, is property, a part of his assets. It is,
therefore, like other property subject to execution at the suit of
the third person who sold the land to the agent of the undisclosed
principal. Choses in action, it is true, were not subject to com-
mon law execution until made so by comparatively modern legis-
lation. But before such legislation they were accessible to credi-
20 Le mandant doit indemniser enti~rement le mandataire de la gestion
de l'affaire, dont il a bien voulu se charger. Cette indeiniti ne consiste
pas seulement a rembourser le mandataire des d~bours6s qu'il a faits; il
faut pour que l'indemniti soit enti.re, qu'il soit dcharg6 des obligations
qu'il a contracteis pour 'ex~cution du mandat." Pothier, Mandat, § 8o.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tors by equitable execution. 21 Even since such legislation, the
right of exoneration can be reached only by equitable execution.
For there is one important difference between a debtor's right of
exoneration and his other choses in action. In general, when the
claim upon a chose in action is satisfied, it is the obligee who
receives the fruits of the claim, and when a debtor's chose in
action against another is sold under execution, the execution
purchaser receives these fruits, as successor to the execution
debtor. But when a claim for exoneration is satisfied, the per-
formance is not to the obligee but to a third person, the obligee
profiting not by a positive addition to his resources, but by the
extinguishment of a liability to the third person. This right is
not the subject of a common law execution. By its nature it is
not marketable, for the buyer would get nothing of value to him
by its purchase. Such a right can be realized only by specific
performance, and it is well settled that equity will compel specific
performance of the obligation to exonerate.22  Furthermore, it
would be idle for the ordinary creditors of the one entitled to be
exonerated from his liability to the third person to seek, by an
equitable execution, to compel their debtor to realize this right of
specific performance. The performance would not inure to their
benefit, but to the advantage of the third person. But this third
person, unlike the other creditors, is vitally interested in the
exercise by his debtor of the latter's right of exoneration. He,
therefore, is clearly entitled to maintain a bill for equitable
execution to compel the debtor to realize his asset, that is, his
right of exoneration.
The reasoning just suggested has been applied in giving a
remedy against the trust estate to one who has furnished supplies
to the trustee for the benefit of the estate. It goes without say-
ing that the trustee alone is liable on the contract with the third
person. But the trustee has the right to apply the trust property
in exoneration of liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the
administration of the trust. If he is unwilling to exercise this
right, the creditor may treat the right as an asset of the trustee
and, by a bill for equitable execution, compel the trustee to
apply the trust property in payment of the liability.23 But the
trustee has not only the right to exonerate himself out of the
2 1 Bayard v. Hofman, 4 John Ch. 450; Drake v. Rice, 130 Mass. 410.
22 1 Ames, Cases in Eq. Jurisd., 64, n. I.
23 Ames, Cases on Trusts (2nd Ed.), 423, n. 1.
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trust property; he has also a right to be exonerated by the cestui
que trust out of the general assets of the latter :24 that is to say,
the duty of the cestui que trust to exonerate the trustee is just
like the duty of the principal to exonerate the agent. It
seems clear that the courts which allow the creditor of the
trustee to reach and apply the trustee's right of exon-
eration out of the trust property, could not consistently refuse to
allow him to reach and apply the trustee's right of exoneration
out of the general substance of the cestui que trust. Clavering v.
Westley,25 is a case in point.
The right of equitable execution upon a debtor's right of exon-
eration is illustrated by another class of cases. If C promises B to
pay B's debt to A, C's undertaking is similar to the obligation of
the principal to exonerate the agent. If C's promise is under seal,
A is generally not allowed to sue C at law even in jurisdictions
which allow such an action upon a promise not under seal. But
A is allowed, nevertheless, to treat C's promise to pay B's debt as
an asset of B's, and to enforce B's right of exoneration
through a decree for its specific performance.2G
It is evident from these illustrations, that, if the courts had
seen their way to charge the undisclosed principal upon the theory
of equitable execution against the agent's right of exoneration,
they would not have been invoking a novel and untried equitable
principle. It is now too late, of course, to apply this theory to
simple contracts made by the agent of an undisclosed principal.
But there seems to be no good reason why it should not be ap-
plied in cases where the agent contracts under seal or by bill or
note, or as a shareholder of a corporation, or by one simple con-
tract in behalf of several independent principals 27 .
It should be observed, however, that the working out of the
right against the undisclosed principal through the agent's right
24 ffardoon v. Belilios, [19oi], A. C. 118.
25 This case does not stand for the general principle to which Lord
Cransworth objected in Walter v. Northern Co., 5 1. M. & G 629, 646.
26 Crowell v. Hospital, 27 N. J. Eq. 650. See also Williston's Wald's
Pollock on Contracts, 245.
27The principle of equitable execution upon the debtor's right of
exoneration is equally applicable to cases of disclosed agency, in which
the agent only is directly liable on the contract with the third person, as
when the contract is by instrument under seal, or by a negotiable instru-
ment, or when, in the case of a simple contract, the third person and the
agent agree that the latter, and not the principal, shall be liable on the
contract.
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of exoneration, will not always lead to the same practical results
in the case of contracts under seal, that have been reached by the
anomalous actual doctrine governing simple contracts.
If, for example, the principal has paid the agent in discharge
of his duty to him, that ends the agent's right to exoneration and,
consequently, the third person's right to equitable execution. But
in England, the undisclosed principal presumably continues liable
notwithstanding his payment to the principal unless the conduct
of the third person led him to suppose that such payment would
terminate his liability.
28
The right of exoneration might also be neutralized by the
agent's misconduct after contracting with the third person. He
might, for instance, misappropriate the goods he had bought on
credit for the undisclosed principal. In such a case the third
person would take nothing by his bill for equitable execution. 29
But under the existing anomalous rule the undisclosed principal
would be liable on the agent's contract notwithstanding the
agent's misconduct.
If, again, the agent's right of exoneration never arose, there
could be, of course, no equitable execution for the third person.
If, for example, an agent for an undisclosed principal made a
contract in violation of his instructions, but a contract which
would have been within the scope of his apparent authority, had
the agency been disclosed, the third person could obtain no re-
lief against the principal upon the theory of equitable execution.
For the agent having disobeyed his instructions would have no
right of exoneration against the principal. But in Watteau v.
Fenwick 30, the undisclosed principal was charged upon the agent's
contract in just such a case. 31
In the three instances of simple contracts just considered, the
third person, under the anomalous English and American rule,
28 Heald v. Kenworthy, io Ex. 739; Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q. B. Div.
414, criticising the statements in Armstrong v. Stokes, L. R. 7 Q. B. 598.
Probably the rule of America is the other way.
29 Similarly, a creditor of a trustee seeking to charge the trust estates
or the contingent trust will be defeated in whole or in part if the trustee
is in arrears to the trust estate. R. Johnson, I5 Ch. D. 548; Ames, Cases
on Trusts (2nd ed.), n. 1, par. 2.
30 (1893) I Q. B. 348.
31 See criticisms of this case in Becherc v. Asher, 23 Ont. App. 210,
by Osler, J. A.; in 9 L. Q. R., iii by Sir Frederick Pollock; in Ewart,
Estoppel, 246; and in 37 Sol. J., 28o.
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profits unjustly at the expense of the undisclosed principal. On
the other hand, under that same rule, in at least one case of
simple contract, the third person suffers unjustly to the un-
deserved advantage of the principal. This is true when the
agent, acting for several principals, strangers to each other, in-
stead of making separate contracts in behalf of each, makes a
single lump contract in behalf of all. The principals cannot be
sued jointly upon the contract, nor can any one of them be sued
alone upon the entire contract. But by bills for equitable execu-
tion the third person could reach and apply, towards the satisfac-
tion of his claim against the agent, the latter's separate rights of
exoneration against the independent principals to the extent of
each one's interest in the contract.
If the reasoning of this article is sound, the anomalous, but
established English and American rule is open to these three
objections. First, it violates fundamental principles of contract.
Secondly, it gives the third person no relief against the principal
upon the agent's contracts under seal, his negotiable contracts, or
his liability as a shareholder, although, in point of justice, relief
is demanded as much upon contracts in these forms, as upon
simple contracts. *Thirdly, as a practical working rule in the case
of simple contracts, it frequently operates unjustly, sometimes
putting unmerited burdens upon the principal and sometimes
denying the third person merited relief.
The doctrine of equitable execution upon the agent's right of
exoneration, on the other hand, has these three merits. It accords
with legal principle, it applies uniformly to all forms of contract,
and produces just results.
James Barr Ames.
